Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
- 1 September 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 1 (3), 213-221
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90009-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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