Why don't we perceive our brain states?

Abstract

The major part of this paper is devoted to the issue of how to bridge the gap between perception and action. First, the traditional view of the perception-action relationship is addressed. This view assumes that there are two different and incommensurate coding systems for afferent and efferent patterns (sensory and motor coding). Next, a different view is proposed that invokes the common coding of afferent and efferent patterns. One of the implications of this view is that actions can be controlled and guided by representations of distal events. There is some support for this view from two different sources: the first is nineteenth-century psychology of the will. the other comes from more recent experimental evidence. Some findings from experiments on sensorimotor synchronisation and on the Simon effect are discussed with reference to the notion of distal focusing in action control. In conclusion, the issue raised in the title is addressed. As a tentative answer it is suggested that the reason why our percepts refer to distal events (rather than proximal stimulus patterns or central excitation patterns) is related to the needs of action control. This consideration is discussed within the framework of the common coding approach.