Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- 1 June 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 48 (1), 238-263
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90126-9
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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