Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups
- 1 January 2009
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lowerKeywords
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