Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- 1 June 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 48 (1), 107-133
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90121-x
Abstract
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This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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