Disagreement in Bargaining
- 1 June 1981
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 25 (2), 329-348
- https://doi.org/10.1177/002200278102500206
Abstract
This study reports an experiment designed to test the predictive value of Axelrod's measure of conflict of interest. The results support the conclusion that Axelrod's measure is a good predictor of the time required to reach agreement in a given bargaining game, but that it is not a good pedictor of the frequency with which disagreements will be observed in a given game. The theoretical implications of this conclusion are discussed.Keywords
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