On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation
Preprint
- 1 January 2002
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, continuous action generalization of a Prisoner' Dilemma game. When time preKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Collective Action and the Group Size ParadoxAmerican Political Science Review, 2001
- Repeated Games with Differential Time PreferencesEconometrica, 1999
- Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated GamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1996
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived OpponentEconometrica, 1996
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run PlayersThe Review of Economic Studies, 1990
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient PlayerEconometrica, 1989
- Collusion among asymmetric firms: The case of different discount factorsInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 1989
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete InformationEconometrica, 1986
- Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behaviorPublic Choice, 1974
- Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group SizeAmerican Political Science Review, 1974