An Empirical Analysis of No-Fault Insurance
- 1 June 1982
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Evaluation Review
- Vol. 6 (3), 373-392
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0193841x8200600302
Abstract
A cross-sectional study of state loss experiences in 1977 were analyzed to test whether or not states that adopted no-fault automobile insurance laws experienced a reduction in deterrence. The results showed that pure no-fault states, mandatory no-fault states, and compulsory no-fault states experienced increases in their loss ratios of 7.449%, 6.308%, and 3.955%. respectively. Further analysis found that states that adopted no-fault insurance did not have significantly higher loss experiences before the adoption of such laws. Estimates of the cost savings from the adoption of no-fault insurance suggest annual benefits in the range of $28.8 million to $67 million. Employing these estimates to construct a benefit-cost ratio implies a ratio between 1.17 and 1.31. However, such estimates are subject to important qualifications and the conclusion that no-fault automobile insurance is economically efficient is tenuous, at best.Keywords
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