In Defense of a Probabilistic Theory of Causality
- 1 December 1978
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 45 (4), 604-613
- https://doi.org/10.1086/288838
Abstract
Germund Hesslow has argued recently [2] that a probabilistic theory of causality as advocated by Patrick Suppes [4] has two problems that a deterministic theory avoids. In this paper, I argue that Suppes' probabilistic causal calculus is free of each of these problems and, moreover, that several broader issues raised by Hesslow's discussion tend to support a probabilistic conception of causes.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- Two Notes on the Probabilistic Approach to CausalityPhilosophy of Science, 1976
- An Argument For The Logical Notion of A Memory TracePhilosophy of Science, 1975