Abstract
The Greater Manchester Shopping Inquiry ran from July 1987 to February 1988, employing 3 Inspectors, 27 barristers and 90 consultants, and other expert witnesses. It deserves to be known for more than its vital statistics. It provided an insight into the current state of the art of strategic retail planning in a conurbation. This article presents a view through the eyes of a reluctant participant. Readers will judge for themselves whether and how much to allow for bias, but it should be clear that my opinions are not necessarily shared by Trafford Borough Council. I describe the events leading up to the Inquiry, the roots of which can be traced through Structure Plan documents back to 1974; the 11 major shopping applications received in and around Greater Manchester within 10 months in 1986 for a total of 6 672 000 gross ft2; and the way the planning system, including the Inquiry itself, responded to this challenge. On the basis of this case study, I suggest that the methods and data used to predict demand for shop floorspace are not equal to the problems set by a multi centred conurbation such as Greater Manchester; that the way we apply these methods of prediction tends to under‐estimate rather than over‐estimate; that under‐estimates give rise to at least as many problems as over‐estimates, not the least of which is a loss of control of the kind witnessed in Greater Manchester; and that many of our expectations about what strategic retail planning can do to regenerate our cities are unrealistic.