The APSA and Minority Representation

Abstract

The concept of representation has been much discussed and debated in the literature of political science. My intent here is not to review or evaluate the different meanings or implications that have been given to this concept but instead to focus on specific voting schemes which would allow the expression of minority (as well as majority) viewpoints in an elected voting body in rough proportion to their numbers of supporters in a larger electorate. As a procedural question, we shall look at representation in terms of the operation of voting rules which allow the preferences of a group to be translated into the election of representatives who would be capable of expressing the group's preferences in an elected body. Whether these representatives, upon election, should faithfully attempt to reflect the views of their supporters (the “delegate model”), or instead exercise their own independent judgments on matters before the body (the “free agent model”), is a normative question which will not be considered in this analysis.I shall begin the analysis by postulating two abstract requirements that a voting scheme of proportional representation should meet. I shall then suggest a particular voting scheme which meets these requirements, analyze the logical interrelatedness of the requirements, and finally show the application of the proposed voting scheme to the election of officers and Council members of the American Political Science Association (APSA), using the results of the 1969 APSA election for purposes of illustration. The effects which the size of an elected body has on the strategies available to groups seeking representation on it will be analyzed and illustrated in the Appendix.