Dialectical Decision Theory: A Meta-Theory of Decision-Making

Abstract
This paper presents a meta-logic of decision theory. It utilizes a dialectical formulation [Churchman, C. W. 1966. Hegelian inquiring systems. Internal Working Paper 49, Space Sciences Laboratory, Social Sciences Project, University of California, Berkeley, September; Mason, R. O. 1969. A dialectical approach to strategic planning. Management Sci. 15(8, April) B-403–B-414; Mitroff, I. I. 1971. A communication model of dialectical inquiring systems—A strategy for strategic planning. Management Sci. 17(10, June) B-634–648.] as a prescriptive methodology for minimizing statistical decision errors of the third kind; i.e., the error of solving the “wrong” decision problem when one should have solved the “right” problem. The dialectical formulation is chosen because it is the only existent methodological form which both utilizes conflict over value issues in a productive fashion and ensures a minimal sense of completeness in the decision-space of possible problem choice [Mitroff, I. I. On the general problem of building a generalized model of general models (in preparation).]. The result is the development of a meta-theory of decision-making. It is argued that the concept of a Dialectical Inquiring System [Mitroff, I. I. 1971. A communication model of dialectical inquiring systems—A strategy for strategic planning. Management Sci. 17(10, June) B-634–648; Mitroff, I. I. On the general problem of building a generalized model of general models (in preparation).] is to our meta-theory of decision-making as the concept of a lottery [Pratt, J. W., H. Raiffa, R. Schlaifer. The foundations of decision under uncertainty: An elementary exposition. J. Amer. Stat. Assoc. 59 353–375.] is to the ordinary theory of decision-making.