Representing partial knowledge in an algebraic security model
- 4 December 2002
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Abstract
The author extends a security model and specification language for key distribution protocols which describes protocols algebraically in terms of term-rewriting systems to include certain kinds of partial knowledge available to a penetrator. She also shows how the model describes the actions by which a penetrator takes advantage of partial knowledge, and gives an example of a protocol specified in the language.Keywords
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