US hegemony and the World Bank: the fight over people and ideas

Abstract

Hegemony refers to a dominant group's ability to make others want the same thing as it wants for itself. It rests upon (1) a substantive pillar of belief that the system of rule created by the dominant group brings material and other benefits to all or most participants and that the feasible alternatives are worse, and (2) a procedural pillar of belief that the processes and procedures of the dominant system of rule are fair and appropri1ate and will be enforced on the dominant group as well as the subordinate group. But the requirements of (1) and (2) may undermine each other - this is the hegemon's dilemma. US intervention in multilateral organizations to strengthen the substantive pillar - the organizations' commitment to the idea of mutual benefits from free markets - may come at the expense of the procedural pillar, by breaking collectively legitimated rules of, for example, personnel selection or research independence; and vice versa. This paper explores US-World Bank relations in the context of US efforts to influence the statements made by the incumbents of two important ideas-controlling positions in the World Bank, the chief economist and the director of the World Development Report. It takes the firing of chief economist Joseph Stiglitz and the resignation of director of the World Development Report 2000, Ravi Kanbur, as case studies. It draws broader conclusions about how hegemony actually works, about the extent of World Bank autonomy, and about the debate on development agendas.