On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort
- 1 November 1999
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 13 (4), 85-104
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.13.4.85
Abstract
Is there a useful function for an international lender of last resort (ILLR)--defined as crisis lender and crisis manager? Yes for international capital flows are excessively volatile and contagious, and because an ILLR can help mitigate the effects of this instability. I examine the Bagehot rules, and their applicability in an international context, focusing on the problem of moral hazard. I argue that a critical condition for the successful operation of an ILLR, a role that is to an important extent played by the IMF, is to ensure private sector involvement in the resolution of emerging market financial crises.This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Private and Public Supply of LiquidityJournal of Political Economy, 1998
- The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, ProspectsBrookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998
- SHOULD THE FUNCTIONS OF MONETARY POLICY AND BANKING SUPERVISION BE SEPARATED?Oxford Economic Papers, 1995
- The lender-of-last-resort function in the context of national and international financial crisesReview of World Economics, 1985
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and LiquidityJournal of Political Economy, 1983
- THE BAGEHOT PROBLEMThe Manchester School, 1977