Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data
- 1 April 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 41 (3-5), 943-950
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00052-4
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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