Soft Incentives and Collective Action: Participation in the Anti-Nuclear Movement
- 27 January 1986
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 16 (1), 87-112
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400003811
Abstract
The standard explanation of collective action in modern political economy can be outlined as follows: a collective (or public) good is only an incentive for a joint contribution to its provision, if those who benefit from the good at least perceive some influence arising from their contribution, the costs of contributing being otherwise greater than the benefits derived from it; otherwise joint efforts for the provision of the collective good will not ensue. If the good itself does not stimulate collective action, contributions will nevertheless occur when selective incentives become effective. These are benefits arising from contributing and/or costs resulting from no contribution being made.Keywords
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