Political and economic influences on the bureaucratic allocation of federal funds: The case of Urban Development Action Grants
- 30 September 1984
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Urban Economics
- Vol. 16 (2), 158-172
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0094-1190(84)90039-1
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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