Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity and Imitative Trust
Open Access
- 27 October 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 5 (10), e13475
- https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0013475
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity, a key concept in behavioral experiments and evolutionary game theory, provides a mechanism that allows reciprocal altruism to emerge in a population of self-regarding individuals even when repeated interactions between pairs of actors are unlikely. Recent empirical evidence show that humans typically follow complex assessment strategies involving both reciprocity and social imitation when making cooperative decisions. However, currently, we have no systematic understanding of how imitation, a mechanism that may also generate negative effects via a process of cumulative advantage, affects cooperation when repeated interactions are unlikely or information about a recipient's reputation is unavailable. Here we extend existing evolutionary models, which use an image score for reputation to track how individuals cooperate by contributing resources, by introducing a new imitative-trust score, which tracks whether actors have been the recipients of cooperation in the past. We show that imitative trust can co-exist with indirect reciprocity mechanisms up to a threshold and then cooperation reverses -revealing the elusive nature of cooperation. Moreover, we find that when information about a recipient's reputation is limited, trusting the action of third parties towards her (i.e. imitating) does favor a higher collective cooperation compared to random-trusting and share-alike mechanisms. We believe these results shed new light on the factors favoring social imitation as an adaptive mechanism in populations of cooperating social actors.Keywords
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