Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms
- 1 October 2002
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 57 (5), 1857-1889
- https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00482
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
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