Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- 1 June 1986
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 39 (1), 251-269
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient EquilibriaThe Review of Economic Studies, 1986
- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with DiscountingEconometrica, 1985
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price InformationEconometrica, 1984
- Optimal cartel trigger price strategiesJournal of Economic Theory, 1983
- Sequential EquilibriaEconometrica, 1982
- Discrete and Continuous Bang-Bang and Facial Spaces Or: Look for the Extreme PointsSIAM Review, 1980
- Decision Problems with Expected Utility Critera, I: Upper and Lower Convergent UtilityMathematics of Operations Research, 1977
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for SupergamesThe Review of Economic Studies, 1971