Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to examine some ethical and legal aspects of nontherapeutic experimentation with living human fetuses, especially in the context of abortion. Key questions about such research subjects are the status of the fetus, the problem of consent, and the relations between means and ends. The case for considering the fetus a member of the human community, and therefore as endowed with certain rights, is based upon an appeal for consistency with the general evaluation of fetal life. Secondly, consent for nontherapeutic procedures cannot be based upon the analogy of parental rights, and, with rare exceptions, cannot be justified on any other grounds. Thirdly, both humanistic and religious traditions would object to nontherapeutic research with such subjects on the ground that a human being should never be a mere means to the needs of others. The conclusion, therefore, is that such experimentation with living human fetuses is morally unjustifiable.

This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit: