Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking
- 1 May 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 45 (3), 546-568
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00021-9
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- Stochastic Pollution, Permits, and Merger IncentivesJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1999
- Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms BargainJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1998
- Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollutionJournal of Public Economics, 1997
- Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choiceJournal of Public Economics, 1994
- Noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets: Some extensionsJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1991
- Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliantJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1990
- Firm behaviour under regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraintsJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1987
- Market Power and Transferable Property RightsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984
- Random wastes, imperfect monitoring and environmental quality standardsJournal of Public Economics, 1983
- Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxesJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1978