The impact of electricity market design upon investment under uncertainty: The effectiveness of capacity mechanisms
- 30 September 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Utilities Policy
- Vol. 16 (3), 215-227
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2007.12.002
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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