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Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
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Publications
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
SS
Steven Shavell
Steven Shavell
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1 January 1979
journal article
Published by
JSTOR
in
The Bell Journal of Economics
Vol. 10
(1)
,
55
https://doi.org/10.2307/3003319
Abstract
This article studies arrangements concerning the payment of a fee by a principal to his agent. For such an arrangement, or fee schedule, to be Pareto optimal, i...
Keywords
INCENTIVES
RISK SHARING
AGENT RELATIONSHIP
PARETO OPTIMAL
ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING
STUDIES ARRANGEMENTS
ARTICLE STUDIES
FEE SCHEDULE
All Articles
Open Access
Cited by 766 articles