Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data
- 1 January 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 41 (1), 1-35
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(96)00017-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 80 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease AuctionEconometrica, 1995
- Predicting the Winner's CurseDecision Sciences, 1994
- Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement AuctionsJournal of Political Economy, 1993
- Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behavior in a Multi-Unit Auction Market: An Empirical AnalysisThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1993
- A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed biddersInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1983
- An Analysis of Alternative Bidding Systems for Leasing Offshore OilThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
- Identical Bids and Cartel BehaviorThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1976
- The Statistical Structure of Bidding for Oil and Mineral RightsJournal of the American Statistical Association, 1971
- Comment on "Collusion in the Auction Market for Treasury Bills"Journal of Political Economy, 1964
- COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERSThe Journal of Finance, 1961