Quantum Cryptography Protocols Robust against Photon Number Splitting Attacks for Weak Laser Pulse Implementations
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- 6 February 2004
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Letters
- Vol. 92 (5), 057901
- https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevlett.92.057901
Abstract
We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error.Keywords
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