Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- 1 August 1982
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (2), 280-312
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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