A Signalling Model of Environmental Overcompliance
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
I model environmental overcompliance as a signalling device. In the model, a benevolent government may or may not tighten environmental standards. Production coKeywords
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