Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions
Top Cited Papers
- 1 February 2003
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 111 (1), 1-51
- https://doi.org/10.1086/344801
Abstract
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This publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
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