The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice
- 1 March 1984
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 78 (1), 1-16
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1961245
Abstract
One contemporary method of reconciling the conflict in methodology between determinism and indeterminism is the notion of rational choice, which allows for both regularities in behavior and artistic creation. A detailed explanation of artistry within the rational choice context has not yet been developed, so this essay offers such an explanation in terms of the notion of heresthetics or the dynamic manipulation of the conditions of choice. The running example used throughout is the decision on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 on the method of selecting the president.Keywords
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