Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- 1 April 1975
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 10 (2), 187-217
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2
Abstract
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This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective DecisionsThe Review of Economic Studies, 1969
- Stability in VotingEconometrica, 1961
- Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision RulesThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1960