Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach
- 1 February 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 79 (2), 399-427
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00120-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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