Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers
- 1 May 1999
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 114 (2), 389-432
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556034
Abstract
We examine the labor market for mutual fund managers. Using data from 1992–1994, we find that “termination” is more performance-sensitive for youngerKeywords
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