Abstract
This paper is part of a wider research programme which aims at understanding the organizational factors that promote inflexible technology. The technology of the Space Shuttle's performance has been poor in many areas; that the technology was chosen throught a centralized process dominated by a few like-minded organizations with little debate and compromise, and with risk falling on public pockets; and that there are more flexible technical alternatives, some of which are open to more decentralized decision making. Lessons are drawn about the problems of developing inflexible technology, and the degree of organizational centralization appropriate to technical innovation. These are restated in terms of incrementalism. In general, a technology that performs better is likely to be one which can be developed in a series of small steps, with choices made in a decentralized way. Suggestions are made for technical developments that would enhance the flexibility of the US space programme following the Shuttle, together with organizational chgange that would ease their introduction.

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