Taking a Closer Look: Reasserting the Role of the Self-Concept in Dissonance Theory

Abstract

In an early revision of Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance, Aronson argued that dissonance was aroused when an important element of the self-concept was violated. More recently, Cooper and Fazio's "New Look" version of the theory maintains that dissonance is the result of feeling personally responsible for an aversive outcome. This article examines the claims of these two positions, ultimately arguing for the superiority of Aronson's formulation. The authors maintain that research findings in support of the New Look can also be explained by the self-concept formulation. In addition, they argue that the twin postulates of the New Look position-personal responsibility and aversive consequences-lack adequate conceptual grounding without reference to the self-concept. Finally, previous research is examined that is incompatible with the New Look, as well as new data suggesting that aversive consequences are not necessary for dissonance arousal.