Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives in a repeated game with incomplete contracts
- 1 June 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 20 (3), 251-284
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-4870(99)00009-4
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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