An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
- 1 January 1994
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 4 (1), 11-40
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211117
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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