Tit-For-Tat in guppies (Poecilia reticulata): the relative nature of cooperation and defection during predator inspection
- 1 July 1991
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Ecology
- Vol. 5 (3), 300-309
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02214234
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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