How Auctions Work for Wine and Art
- 1 August 1989
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 3 (3), 23-36
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.3.3.23
Abstract
At the first wine auction I ever attended, I saw the repeal of the law of one price. This empirical surprise led me to begin collecting data on wine auctions, to interview auctioneers, and even to buy a little wine. In the meantime I have also had the opportunity (with John Abowd) to observe and collect data on the auction sale of impressionist and contemporary paintings. This paper reports on some of the empirical regularities that I and others have observed in the actual operation of the auction markets for these items. In view of the rich and diverse array of theoretical literature on auctions, it seems high time economists began to spell out precisely what facts it is meant to explain.Keywords
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English AuctionsJournal of Political Economy, 1987
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse BuyersEconometrica, 1984
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive BiddingEconometrica, 1982
- A Bidding Model of Perfect CompetitionThe Review of Economic Studies, 1977