African Swine Fever (ASF) is a viral disease of pigs which can have devastating effects on a country’s economy, agriculture, and food security. The disease, which has nearly a 100% mortality rate, is transmitted to domestic pigs by warthog ticks and by contact with other infected pigs or pig material. Although there is no vaccine against ASF, there are measures that can be taken – both before and after the appearance of the disease – that can drastically reduce the scope of an outbreak and limit the harm it causes. This document outlines the major institutional and legal elements governments should consider in preparing for and reacting to an outbreak of ASF. It was prepared by the Development Law Service of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) with the input of FAO’s Animal Health Division, based on information collected under the auspices of the regional Technical Co-operation Project, Enhancing Prevention Capacities for Emergency Intervention against African Swine Fever in West Africa (TCP/RAF/7822). This document is intended neither to describe the current situation in at-risk countries nor to tell governments what to do. The former would be difficult in any event because with the upsurge in international travel, materials of all kinds – including those that may spread ASF – are easily dispersed throughout the world, and thus every country may be at risk. And the latter is neither feasible nor desirable, since the political, cultural, and economic landscape in each country will affect the choices that are available to and that may be decided upon by policymakers. We recommend therefore that the information contained in this document be considered a checklist for planners interested in improving their ability to respond rapidly and effectively to ASF. And although the report outlines some measures that are distinct to ASF, some other measures may be useful in the consideration of other diseases. Some countries will be able to put in place all the elements outlined in Part I: Elements To Be in Place Before an Outbreak, or may already have implemented most of them. Other countries will succeed with only a few. Once the disease is detected, some countries will be able to put into effect all the measures outlined in Part II: Actions To Be Taken After Outbreak, and others only a fraction. In whatever case, the rapidity with which countries act, and the scope of their reaction, will vary, for reasons already mentioned. One final note: some elements in Part I also appear in Part II. For example, public awareness is both an element that should be in place long before there is an epizootic, as well as something that should be continued and strengthened (with updated information) once the disease appears in the territory. Similarly, legislation is not only something that needs to be enacted once there is an emergency, but is something that countries ought to collect, assess, and prepare long before the outbreak of an animal disease.