Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach
- 30 June 1986
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 11 (3), 283-294
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(86)90029-6
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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