Economic modeling of methods to stimulate quality improvement

Abstract

Objective. This paper uses an economic model to compare three methods for stimulating quality improvement: payment incentives, competition for patients, and emphasis on professional ethics. Design. Use an economic model to simulate the impact on quality distortions (risk selection) of differences in payment incentives, competition for patients, and emphasis on professional ethics. Setting. Health care policymakers in many countries seek to use incentives and competition to spur quality improvement. However, strong incentives often promote risk selection: insurers and providers financially benefit from distorting quality to attract profitable patients. Results. The analysis suggests that intense competition for patients and strong financial rewards for cost control can exacerbate quality distortions and compromise social solidarity. Conclusions. Carefully regulated competition and mixed forms of provider payment (risk sharing) appear to be the best options. Moreover, designing competition, regulation, payment, and other forms of health policy to promote suppliers’ professional ethics can help society to reap the quality and efficiency benefits of competition and incentives without sacrificing social solidarity.