Measurement of social power, opportunity costs, and the theory of two-person bargaining games
- 1 January 1962
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Behavioral Science
- Vol. 7 (1), 67-80
- https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830070105
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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- A formal theory of social power.Psychological Review, 1956
- Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of UtilityJournal of Political Economy, 1955
- An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence.American Political Science Review, 1955
- Two-Person Cooperative GamesEconometrica, 1953
- Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable UtilityEconometrica, 1950
- The Bargaining ProblemEconometrica, 1950