Tests of fairness models based on equity considerations in a three-person ultimatum game
- 1 December 2001
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 4 (3), 203-219
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01673533
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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