Dividends, Asymmetric Information, and Agency Conflicts: Evidence from a Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms
- 1 June 1998
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 53 (3), 879-904
- https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00038
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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