Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment
- 31 January 2005
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 24 (1), 211-223
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.09.001
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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