In Defense of the Popper-Miller Argument
- 1 March 1986
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 53 (1), 110-113
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289295
Abstract
In their 1983 article, Popper and Miller present an argument against inductive probability. This argument is criticized by Redhead in his 1985 article. The aim of the present note is to state one form of the Popper-Miller argument, and defend it against Redhead's criticisms.Keywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF INDUCTIVE PROBABILITYThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1985
- The impossibility of inductive probabilityNature, 1984
- The impossibility of inductive probability (reply)Nature, 1984
- The impossibility of inductive probabilityNature, 1984
- The impossibility of inductive probabilityNature, 1984
- A proof of the impossibility of inductive probabilityNature, 1983