Quality Incentives: The Case Of U.K. General Practitioners
Open Access
- 1 May 2004
- journal article
- Published by Health Affairs (Project Hope) in Health Affairs
- Vol. 23 (3), 112-118
- https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.23.3.112
Abstract
The United Kingdom is implementing major changes to the national contract for general practitioners (GPs). A central plank of the new arrangements is an ambitious scheme to reward high-quality care. Each general practice will be scored on 146 performance indicators according to the measured quality of care it delivers, and its accumulated score will determine the magnitude of the quality payment it receives. About 18 percent of practice earnings will be at risk. This paper describes the incentive scheme, discusses its potential benefits and risks, and draws out the implications for evaluation.Keywords
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