Predisposition and Behaviour in a Collective Dilemma

Abstract

Three studies examined subjects' self-predicted and actual cooperation in a 10-person collective dilemma game. The first study examined the behaviour of subjects who were provided with full information about the nature of their social interdependency and their “dilemma.” Contrary to Kelley and Grzelak's (1972) prediction, the overall degree of cooperation was low (30%). However, subjects classified as “cooperators” on the basis of their pregame self-predictions were more cooperative than those classified as “non-cooperators” (p < .005). The second study provided false feed back, indicating that the majority of the players were cooperating. “Cooperators” were more cooperative than their counterparts in the first study, (p < .05), while “noncooperators” were as uncooperative as before. This led to the conclusion that the lack of cooperation in the free play situation did not stem from misperception or suspicion of the other players' motivation, but rather from the individualistic predispositions of some of the players. The third study provided further evidence about the stability of the individualistic predispositions.